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ABSTRACT
Random, unpredictable, unstructured stimuli are an everyday part of life. Yet despite this
breadth of experience and sophisticated statistical learning mechanisms, humans report
patterning even in stimuli that are paradigmatically random. In two experiments, participants
evaluated structured and random environments presented in a common statistical learning
paradigm, the Serial Reaction Time task. I presented random and specifically nonrandom
sequences to humans (Experiments 1 and 2) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta, Experiment
2) to explore the seemingly antagonistic relationship between explicit, intuitive beliefs about
these sequences and implicit statistical learning of sequence properties. Sequence predictability
and experience with a given sequence type significantly predicted reaction times only weakly

and inconsistently across the two experiments. Accordingly, participant choices scarcely
deviated from chance, and in those rare cases they deviated from chance largely without
directionality, and were not significantly predicted by either sequence predictability or
experience with a given sequence type.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Human animals (hereafter, humans) and nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) process
sequential information in a variety of contexts. Videos and songs are the compilation of
sequences of individual images or sounds that combine to form meaningful, distinct wholes.
Spatial navigation, whether through maze, metropolitan street, or vast foraging environment, is
the concatenation of a sequence of decisions made at choice points (Tolman, 1938). Language is
made up of only a noisy stream of speech sounds from which humans, from infancy,
nevertheless acquire a functional understanding.
Humans and animals are also exposed to a subset of sequences that have no inherent
structure. Such stimuli will be described here as random or unstructured. The concept of
randomness is notoriously difficult to define and, following Nickerson (2002) and others, the
term will be used here to describe stimuli produced by a process with specific properties. First,
the process must produce each potential output with equal probability. A process that outputs
according to chance, but is not equally likely to output each possible alternative, would be
probabilistic, but not truly random. Second, each output must be independent of all previous and
future outputs. Combined, these properties ensure that any given sequence of outputs generated
by such a process is as likely as any other sequence of outputs generated by this process.
Fair coin flips, dice rolls, roulette wheel spins, and lottery drawings are examples of
processes that approximate the described properties. But examples of paradigmatically random
processes are not limited to the outputs of games of chance. The typical determination of human
biological sex is very nearly a random process, with female and male sexes equally likely to be
conceived and each person’s biological sex independent of that of any other person (Nickerson,
2002; Scheibehenne, Todd, & Wilke, 2011). Protean predator-prey interactions are often given as
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another, more ecological, example of unstructured patterns of behavior (Neuringer & Jensen,
2013; Sanabria & Thrailkill, 2009). Consider a hungry shark chasing a seal in the open ocean.
This chase creates a dynamic in which the optimal response of the seal is to be as unpredictable
in its zig-zags as possible and, ideally, be perfectly random, to elude the sharp teeth that gnash
behind it. The shark’s optimal response is to match the proportion of zigs and zags emitted by the
seal without becoming predictable. Any deviations from randomness in the responses of either
animal will be exploited, and thus each must be prepared both to discriminate any degree of
nonrandomness and to produce a random series of outputs.
Any sophisticated sequence processing comes first from the detection that meaningful
relations between stimuli exist. For example, language learning is possible given exposure to
natural language at a critical developmental period, but will never be facilitated by
ungrammatical auditory stimuli. The constant challenge to the observer is to infer the properties
of sequences, and of the sequence-generating process, on the basis of very limited information.
This challenge has long been of interest to psychologists.
1.1

Studying Random Events
Because of the various connotations of the word ‘random,’ two distinctions should be

made. First, random does not necessarily connote uniqueness. A sequence of outputs from a
process with the aforementioned properties need not be unusual or unique, so long as this
sequence was as likely to be generated as any other. A random sequence can appear highly
structured, and indeed any sequence of sufficient length is extremely likely to appear structured
for some subset of the sequence (Nickerson, 2002). Similarly, no absolute judgment of
randomness may be made on the basis of analysis of the outputs alone. There is no proof that a
sequence of events is random. Even highly unlikely outputs will be produced by a truly random
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process, and unlikely events never occurring would be a highly salient marker for
nonrandomness (Paulos, 1989).
No single, standardized method for assessing the degree to which humans can produce or
discriminate a random process has been firmly established (for a review, see Bar-Hillel &
Wagenaar, 1991). Nevertheless, some general types can be identified. One methodology uses
versions of economic games with mixed strategy equilibria (for examples, see Mookherjee &
Sopher, 1994; Rapoport & Budescu, 1992; Sanabria & Thrailkill, 2009). Such games are wellsuited for use with both humans and animals, and the apocryphal predator-prey dynamic outlined
above can be thought of as a naturalistic version of the game Matching Pennies (MP). In such a
game, two players repeatedly compete in a head-to-head, winner-take-all game. One player wins
a round by matching the responses of the second player (i.e., the shark bites where the seal is
predicted to be), while the second player wins by preventing this from happening (i.e., the seal
eludes the shark).
Another methodology, discrimination experiments, required participants to determine
whether a sequence was the result of a random process (e.g., Lopes & Oden, 1987). For
example, participants were given 100-item sets of heads and tails outcomes and asked to
determine whether the set was generated by a random or nonrandom process. In a third, but
complementary, methodology, production experiments present participants with a set of possible
stimuli (for example, lefts and rights, heads and tails, ones and zeroes, X’s and O’s, letters of the
alphabet, etc.; hereafter ‘items’) that they are instructed to produce a random sequence (for an
example, see Chapanis, 1953). In such an experiment, a participant might be asked to simulate
the outcomes of flipping a fair coin 100 times (e.g., Heads-Heads-Tails-Heads-Tails-TailsTails…). Experimenters can then use the objective properties of the sequences that participants
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discriminated or produced – the relative frequencies of each item, any serial dependencies across
items - to determine their understanding of randomness (for an example, see Lopes & Oden,
1987).
Though there is no test of randomness, experimenters can explore the conditions in which
participants make the judgment that a sequence is random and probe the participants’ responses
for evidence that they are not truly approximating the likely outputs of a random sequence. Serial
dependencies, in which a given item is more or less likely based on the items that come before or
after it, are often used for this purpose (for an example, see Neuringer, 1986). The relative
frequencies of each of the alternative stimuli are used as another measure, as are the relative
frequencies of series of two or more items.
1.2

Humans and Random Events
A few conclusions may be drawn from the experimental frameworks outlined above.

Humans, especially outside of the competitive environment of the MP tasks, are repeatedly
found to emit a common set of faulty intuitions about random sequences. One such intuition is
that random sequences will be less likely to repeat the same item than to alternate to another
item. This is termed the overalternation bias or negative recency effect. Participants are
consistently found to judge sequences that alternate from one item to other items approximately
60% to 70% of the time as most random (for example, Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Falk &
Konold, 1997; Scholl & Greifeneder, 2011; Zhao, Hahn, & Osherson, 2014). Sequences that
alternate at this rate are frequently reported as more random than are even paradigmatically
random sequences. And this report does not change when the sequences are presented in
alternate ways, as in the randomly and nonrandomly generated pixel arrays and clocklike motion
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of the stimuli of Zhao and colleagues (2014) or the checkerboard grids of Falk (1975,
unpublished dissertation cited in Falk & Konold, 1997).
The overalternation bias is a more general version of the gambler’s fallacy, the mistaken
intuition that random sequences are self-correcting with regard to item frequency or other
qualities (Lyons, Weeks, & Elliott, 2013). For example, a typical expression of the gambler’s
fallacy states that after a string of coin flips turn up heads, humans will often judge that the
subsequent flip is more likely than not to be tails. Furthermore, the number of repetitions dictates
the strength of the bias. For example, a random sequence that produces Tails-Tails-Tails-TailsTails will make a subsequent Heads outcome seem more likely than would a sequence that
produces Tails-Tails.
A byproduct of this tendency to alternate is that occasions in which many of the same
items appear in a sequence consecutively (hereafter ‘runs’) are less frequent, and less extreme,
than should be expected in a random sequence. The length, frequency, and timing of these runs
make a unique contribution to judgments of randomness (Sun & Wang, 2010). Run lengths and
the frequency of alternation between stimuli are correlated, but not perfectly so. Scholl and
Greifeneder (2011) used participant ratings of the randomness of sequences to determine which
of the properties was more responsible for participants’ judgments of the randomness of
sequences. They found that the sequences rated as most random overalternated, but that this
effect was weaker as the length of any individual run increased. In effect, the ratings suggested
that overalternation was viewed as evidence of randomness and long runs of a single item were
viewed as evidence for structure. Combined, the two properties do much to describe the
characteristics that participants used to judge sequences as random or nonrandom.
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Explaining the mechanism(s) for why such a bias would exist has proven more
challenging. One line of inquiry seeks to use the qualities of the individuals who performed the
randomness perception and production experiments to help explain their outputs. The statistical
education and training of the participants would seem, at face, to have a large effect on their
functional understandings of the concept of randomness. However, experiments that have
compared statistically naïve participants and those with extensive experience with mathematics,
probability theory, or statistics do not find large differences between the groups (Chapanis, 1995;
Lopes & Oden, 1987; Nickerson & Butler, 2012). The cognitive capacities and
psychopathologies of participants are of greater importance. The attention and working memory
that participants apply to perception and production of random events play a critical role, as
evidenced by attentional biases towards regularities (Zhao, Al-Aidroos, & Turk-Browne, 2013)
and the ways participants detect patterns in sequences stored in working memory (Kareev,
1995a, 1995b, 2000; Kareev, Lieberman, & Lev, 1997). Nonrandom, but not necessarily
overalternating, sequences are generated by autistic and intellectually disabled participants
(Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Rinehart, 2002), participants with closed-head injuries (Azouvi,
Jokic, Van Der Linden, Marlier, & Bussel, 1996), and participants afflicted by Parkinson’s
disease (Brown, Soliveri, & Jahanshahi, 1998), Alzheimer’s disease (Brugger, Monsch, Salmon,
& Butters, 1996), hemispatial neglect (Loetscher & Brugger, 2009) or alcohol dependency
(Rosenberg, Weber, Crocq, Duval, & Macher, 1990), and schizophrenia (Rosenberg et al., 1990).
A classic review of this literature compiled by Tune (1964), and later updated by Brugger
(1997), listed the numerous factors that contribute to human randomness perception and
production and concluded that working memory limitations are the principal determinant of
participant behavior with random sequences. When working memory was disadvantaged by
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asking participants to produce random sequences rapidly (Baddeley, 1966) or by increasing the
weight of task load that participants bear by imposing a concurrent serial recall, semantic
category generation, digit generation, or fluid intelligence task (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, &
Duncan, 1998), the sequences that participants produced were less random. On this view, a
random sequence is one that does not fail the participants’ tests of randomness within the stretch
of items stored in their working memories (Diener, 1985). These tests are not the formal tests
described earlier, and largely seem to test that the frequencies of individual items in working
memory are consistent with what the item frequencies should be for the sequence as a whole.
The overalternation bias is therefore a specific version of the representativeness heuristic of
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Though a sequence that alternates more often than by chance
and goes on fewer, shorter runs is nonrandom when considered as a whole, the shorter
subsequences that participants evaluate in working memory are representative in that they are
very likely to contain equal proportions of the different items and are unlikely to contain any
long run that would indicate nonrandomness. Interesting supporting evidence comes from
demonstrations that the “seven-plus-or-minus-two” capacity for short-term memory is in fact a
sweet spot for the early detection, or lack thereof, of meaningful relationships (Kareev, 1995a,
1995b, 2000; Kareev et al., 1997). That is, Kareev and colleagues argued on a statistical basis
that sampling 5 to 9 items is ideal (enough, but not excessive) for swift detection of strong
correlations in sequences.
However, participants have the same erroneous beliefs about randomness when
sequences are perceived in their entirety and working memory need not be engaged to the same
degree in order to compile the sequence (Falk, 1975; Zhao et al., 2014). A second theoretical
account of the overalternation bias thus focuses instead on the prospect of encoding sequences

8

into long-term memory. This encoding hypothesis posits that judgments of randomness are made
when participants are unable to meaningfully encode a sequence into long-term memory (Falk &
Konold, 1997). Falk and Konold demonstrated that both participants’ subjective ratings of how
difficult a sequence will be to encode and also their objective memorization performance better
predicted judgments of randomness than did the objective properties of the sequence. The
relationship between long-term memory and randomness judgments works in the opposite
direction as well: Olivola and Oppenheimer (2008) demonstrated that when participants believed
that a sequence was random, they later remembered it as having fewer runs and greater
alternation. In synergy with the availability heuristic of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), runs of
single items are easily chunked together and recalled from memory and therefore their presence
or absence is disproportionately emphasized in judgments of randomness. Groups of items that
are more difficult to encode (like those that frequently alternate) are less easily recalled, harder to
describe, and more likely to be perceived as random.
Finally, Brugger (1997) offered a cheeky observation as a counterpoint to memory-based
accounts of randomness understanding: coins and dice have no memory at all, and they are used
to produce perfectly random stimuli. An alternative, or perhaps supplemental, hypothesis is that
the overalternation bias is not only an issue of executive control or working memory limitations,
but also reveals weaknesses in participants’ beliefs about the properties of random events. This
faulty concept hypothesis is exemplified by individuals’ explicit adherence to the gambler’s
fallacy, and is part of a much larger family of mistakes that humans make in probabilistic
scenarios (Falk, 2014; Nickerson, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The word “random” is
poorly defined, used in a variety of contexts, and highly loaded, such that the mere inclusion of
the term is enough to influence participants’ memories and perceptions (Nickerson, 2002;
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Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008). In all of these tasks, participants were asked, either implicitly or
explicitly, to express their idea of the concept of randomness. Their failures to be truly random
may thus reveal less about inadequacies of memory or executive pattern detection and more
about how poorly they understood what it means for an event to be random in the first place.
1.3

Randomness Failures in Broader Context
The specificity of the overalternation bias is curious in light of evidence from animals

and a growing body of research on statistical learning.
1.3.1

Animal literature

Animals interact with structured sequences of information in many of the same ways as
humans do (Conway & Christiansen, 2001). From repeated and prolonged experiences in an
environment, they learn about the relationships between events, including relationships of a
probabilistic nature. Animals must also deal with unstructured information. If the description of
protean behaviors described earlier is accurate, animals reckon with sequences that are as close
to random as can be approximated by other animals (Neuringer & Jensen, 2012; Sanabria &
Thrailkill, 2009). Indeed, it is not difficult to position many ecological decisions as analogous to
the choice presented to humans in the discrimination experiments presented earlier (e.g., was the
process that generated these events random?). An animal that puts itself in a position to learn
underlying relationships of a structured environment will reap the rewards of this learning.
Animals in environments with more arcane structure, or no structure at all, will not have access
to this reward.
Experimental evidence from the MP design described earlier has demonstrated that
animals can at least match the variability of their behavior to the level of variability in their
environments. This involves two processes: ascertainment of the level of variability in the
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environment and generation of responses that are sufficient to exploit the environment. To
explore these capabilities, Barraclough, Conroy, and Lee (2004) analyzed the performance of
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on an oculomotor MP task. The monkeys’ “competitors” in
this task were computer-simulated opponents with different properties. One simulation produced
responses randomly. Another analyzed the animals’ choice histories (from the last 0 to 4 trials),
tested for sequential dependencies in this subset of trials, and weighted responses accordingly.
For example, if a significant bias was found in the monkeys’ choices (for example, 80 percent of
responses were to the right) the simulation chose the opposite option at the same rate to exploit
this tendency. The final simulation analyzed both the choice history and reward history of the
animals. Contrary to human performance in MP games, in which the overalternation bias is
muted but still present (for example, in Rapoport & Budescu, 1992), the monkeys’ responses
were very nearly optimal for all three simulations. The monkeys’ sequences of responses were
not random, as an inclination to win-stay, lose-shift was present throughout and only exploited
by the third simulated opponent. But as the simulations increased in complexity, animals
matched this variability in kind to remain at the Nash equilibrium for the game.
Sanabria and Thrailkill (2009) used a MP game with pigeons (Columba livia) in direct
competition with other pigeons. Each animal in a competitive pair was placed in an operant
chamber with two response options. Each day, a pigeon was rewarded for either matching the
responses of the opponent or for choosing the opposite response. Unlike humans and rhesus
macaques, pigeons demonstrated the opposite bias towards response perseveration. Indeed, this
bias towards perseveration was to such robust degree that it was included as a parameter of
models of pigeon MP performance. With regard only to the capacity to generate random
behaviors, however, pigeons can be exceedingly variable. Experimental environments that
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systematically reward animals for generating sequences that have not been generated within the
last n trials can shape pigeons’ responses into a form indistinguishable from the output of a
random Bernoulli process (for a review, see Neuringer, 2002).
The capacity to produce highly variable, highly unstructured sequences is latent within
these animals, and perhaps in humans as well (Neuringer, 1986). At issue is why baseline human
performance would be so markedly different from that of other species tested on similar tasks
with regard to the specific overalternation bias. Whereas pigeon and rhesus monkey
performances on MP tasks were different, the species both do not have an overalternation bias
and could not be argued to be expressing their erroneous idea of a higher-order concept (as in the
faulty concept hypothesis of human foibles with random stimuli). At face, the faulty concept
hypothesis is supported, yet other explanations exist. Perhaps, through difference in mechanism
or sheer number of trials, the animals received a much more robust opportunity to learn the
structure (or lack thereof) of their environments than did humans.
1.3.2

Statistical learning

Humans, and likely many animal species, implicitly internalize the embedded structures
of their environments via the mechanism of statistical learning. From repeated exposures to
sequences that have an embedded structure, these species learn about the regularities present in
their environments and use this learning adaptively. These regularities can take a number of
forms. In humans, statistical learning is prominent as a mechanism by which children acquire the
phonetic and syntactic regularities of their native languages (Kidd, 2012; Saffran, Aslin, &
Newport, 1996). But it need not only be a mechanism for human language learning. Other
species – rhesus macaques (Heimbauer, Conway, Christiansen, Beran, & Owren, 2012b), cottontop tamarins (Saguinus oedipus, Locurto, Dillon, Collins, Conway, & Cunningham, 2013;
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Locurto, Fox, & Mazzella, 2015; Locurto, Gagne, & Nutile, 2010), pigeons (Locurto et al.,
2015), and rats (Toro & Trobalón, 2005) – have demonstrated substantive levels of statistical
learning as well. Furthermore, stimuli presented in other modalities are subject to statistical
learning (Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2006). Statistical learning is a general mechanism by
which humans and nonhumans learn the meaningful structure of events and objects in their
environments.
The statistical learning literature reveals a robust ability for humans to learn the
regularities and patterns of auditory and visual stimuli to which they are repeatedly exposed.
Critically, these exposures do not require conscious attention nor explicit reward. When
participants were given no explicit instruction other than to look at a screen, they nevertheless
implicitly learned the underlying regularities of the stimuli presented onscreen and reported its
familiarity (Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Moreover, participants learned statistical structure that was
embedded in background noise even as they concurrently completed a primary task (Saffran,
Newport, Aslin, Tunick, & Barrueco, 1997). In a series of experiments, Turk-Browne, Jungé,
and Scholl (2005) demonstrated that statistical learning both is and is not automatic: Some level
of selective attention is required, but the process is still largely unconscious, passive, and
implicit. This finding is bolstered by fMRI evidence that suggests that statistical learning occurs
even without explicit awareness (Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, & Johnson, 2009). Parallel
research with nonhuman primates reveals a similar pattern of results. Locurto and colleagues
demonstrated statistical learning in cotton-top tamarins even when the animals’ responses were
divorced from pellet rewards (Locurto et al., 2013) and specific motoric behaviors (Locurto et
al., 2010).
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1.4

Randomness and Structure
Randomness is, in many ways, a very difficult concept for people to comprehend. They

have pervasive biases about what the properties of randomness are and are not, and maintain
these biases despite a lifetime of evidence that stimuli like coin flips or dice rolls are exactly as
paradigmatically random as they are purported to be. In some ways this is unsurprising. Though
the costs of holding mistaken beliefs about randomness are difficult to quantify, they are unlikely
to be especially severe (Kac, 1983). Indeed, they may actually be adaptive, and allow for useful,
early pattern detection in noisy sequences (Kareev, 1995a, 1995b, 2000; Kareev et al., 1997).
Finally, probability theory is a high-level branch of mathematics and few people, even in
university samples, would be expected to have a substantive level of exposure to it. Individuals
are not described as ‘biased’ or even ‘irrational’ for failures to understand other high-level
concepts in mathematics, so it perhaps makes little sense to fault people for their weak
understandings of probability theory and randomness (Goldman, 1986).
But the discrimination that must be made is between structure and a lack of structure in
the environment, and a review of the statistical learning and randomness literatures reveals
striking inconsistencies. Though humans and animals have a robust ability to learn exceedingly
subtle properties of sequences implicitly in statistical learning tasks, they stubbornly maintain
faulty intuitions about the properties of random sequences when asked to discriminate or produce
random stimuli. Statistical learning methodologies give participants much greater exposure to
sequences, and perhaps this explains the difference. Were random stimuli to be presented in this
mode, with this number of exposures, participants may adaptively use a more correct
understanding of random sequences.
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In this pair of experiments, I presented different types of sequences – some that were
paradigmatically random, some with consistent structure, and some with those properties that
participants typically report as random (e.g., overalternation, few long runs) – in a common
statistical learning paradigm. Participants had the ability to choose the type of sequence that they
would work on for each block of trials. This methodology allowed me to explore humans and
nonhumans’ ability to find and learn the underlying structures of their environments, and to
analyze how this learning affects what sequences they chose to exploit. This methodology, and
its use with both humans and animals, also has implications for the encoding and faulty concept
hypotheses of randomness failures.
Wilke and colleagues have used a similar methodology with undergraduate participants,
community participants with problem or pathological gambling traits, and rhesus macaques
(Blanchard, Wilke, & Hayden, 2014; Scheibehenne et al., 2011; Wilke, Scheibehenne,
Gaissmaier, McCanney, & Barrett, 2014). In these studies, participants were given a series of
choices among simulated slot machines that either produced random outcomes, sequences that
alternated between outcomes more often than by chance, or sequences that were less likely to
alternate between outcomes and more likely to go on streaks of a single outcome. In each
population, participants exhibited a preference for the slot machine that alternated least and
streaked most. In addition, participants made little distinction between a random slot machine
and one that alternated more than chance, and in some cases even chose the random machine at a
higher rate than the overalternating machine.
The unique contribution of the following experiment was simultaneously to assess
participant discrimination between random and structured sequences and implicit learning of
underlying statistical structure in sequences. Unlike in the experiments of Wilke and colleagues,
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participants received a great deal of experience with all sequence types and responses were
divorced from specific rewards. Participant learning of the underlying sequence properties was
assessed on the basis of decreasing response times with experience with structured sequence
variants. Participant choice behavior was therefore determined by two factors: (1) a subjective
judgment on the part of the participant of the structure, patterning, ease of responding, or
predictability of the presented sequences, and/or (2) implicit, statistical learning of the
underlying sequence properties. This experiment was designed to serve as a novel probe of how
these two factors interact (see Table 1 for Research Questions and Hypotheses).
2
2.1

EXPERIMENT 1

Methods
2.1.1

Participants and Apparatus

Thirty-four Georgia State University undergraduate psychology students were invited to
participate in the study for course credit. Completion of the task took 30 minutes to an hour. This
research was approved by Georgia State University’s Institutional Review Board. Testing took
place in laboratory space on the Georgia State University campus. The computer monitor was
positioned approximately 46 cm from the participant, with the joystick positioned on a table
immediately in front of the participant.
2.1.2

Serial Reaction Time task

The Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task is a relatively simple task that has long been used in
sequence learning and statistical learning experiments (Hale, 1969; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987).
Targets appear on a computer screen in multiple locations in succession, and participants must
rapidly respond to the location of the target. When an underlying structure dictates the locations
of the targets, participants can learn this structure and respond more quickly to correctly-
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Table 1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question
Hypothesis
1 RQ1: Do participants
H1: Exposure to the task will significantly predict reduced
learn the structure of
reaction times for structured sequence variants relative to those
sequences presented in
of the random sequence. RTs for nonrandom stimuli that do not
the mode of SRT tasks?
decrease over time relative to RTs for random stimuli will be
interpreted as evidence that the participants failed to learn the
sequence, and thwart interpretation of SELECT choice
behaviors dependent on sequence learning.
2 RQ2: Do participants act H2: Exposure to the task will significantly predict choices of
on the basis of
the sequence that is the same each time over a sequence that is
experience in the task by random. Failure to do so may indicate a lack of preference, or
distinguishing and
lack of motivation to act on preference.
preferentially choosing
an explicitly observable
structure?
3 RQ3: What are the
H3: Exposure to the task will significantly predict human
relative contributions of
participants’ choices of the the random sequence over the
intuitions about random
sequence with a statistically embedded, but not explicitly
sequences and statistical observable, structure. Failure to do so may indicate a lack of
learning of sequence
preference, lack of motivation to act on preference, or, in the
properties on human’s
case of preference for the statistically structured sequence,
choices?
indication that implicit statistical learning contributes to explicit
choice behavior.
4 RQ4: Do monkeys share H4: Exposure to the task will significantly predict macaques’
humans’ intuitions about preferentially chosing structured sequence types over a random
sequence structure?
sequence. Failure to do so may indicate a lack of preference,
lack of motivation to act on preference, or, in the case of
preference for the random sequence, indication that intuitions
about random sequences contribute even to monkey choice
behaviors.

Implication
Participants learn the properties of binary
sequences they experience in SRT tasks, and
perhaps in other modes of binary sequence
presentation (e.g., the perception and production
experiments reviewed above).

That organisms would selectively sample from
more structured stimuli would be a novel
finding, indicating a preference for structure,
information content, or predictability of
sequences.

This pattern of responses would indicate that
sequence choices conform to subjective reports
of what seem like random sequences despite
demonstrable learning of the underlying
structure the nonrandom sequence (H1).

In conformation with the faulty concept
hypothesis, monkeys’ choices will be made
strictly according to learning of sequence
properties, and they will be indifferent to the
overalternation and lack of runs of the
statistically structured sequence.
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predicted targets. Reaction times can be used as an index of the degree to which participants
have learned the properties of the sequence of targets and of their ability to predict any given
target. This methodology was employed for its simplicity, its visual and nonverbal nature, and its
previous application to nonhuman primates (e.g., Heimbauer et al., 2012a). This experiment used
an SRT task with two possible target locations, consistent with the frequent use of binary
response options in the randomness literature (for examples, see Nickerson & Butler, 2012;
Scholl & Greifeneder, 2011; Zhao et al., 2014). Targets appeared on either the left or right of the
screen according to one of three algorithms:
1. A random algorithm that dictated target locations pseudorandomly using the
random.choice()

function from the random module of python 2.7. The output is

considered pseudorandom for its use of the Mersenne Twister as the generator, but can be
considered random to the human and monkey observers of this experiment (Python
Software Foundation, n.d.).
2. A fixed algorithm that dictated target locations absolutely. On each selection of this
algorithm, the same sequence is presented. This sequence was produced by the author
using the ‘Coin Flipper’ utility of random.org.
3. An overalternating algorithm that has specified properties, and thus is structured, but
that has those properties that humans commonly report of random stimuli. Targets
generated by this algorithm alternated 65% of the time and were disproportionately
unlikely to go on runs of more than a few items (for a detailed explanation of this
algorithm, see Appendix A).
Participants made joystick deflections in the direction of the target within 2 seconds of
target onset. To discourage holding the joystick in a single direction (thereby simplifying the
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task), targets did not appear on the screen so long as the joystick remained depressed in a single
direction. Deflections of the joystick in the opposite direction of the target did not end the trial,
but negated joystick responses for 1.5 seconds (and thus sharply decreased the amount of time in
which a correct deflection could occur). The total trial duration was twice the sequence length, in
seconds (42 seconds). Failure to deflect the joystick properly within the 2 second response
window resulted in a blank screen that persisted for the remainder of the trial duration. For
example, if a participant received a blank screen after 8 seconds of a 21-item sequence, they
waited 34 seconds before starting a new trial.
2.1.3

SELECT task

The SELECT task was originally developed to offer nonhuman primates the opportunity
to choose the order in which they complete a series of tasks (Perdue, Evans, Washburn,
Rumbaugh, & Beran, 2014; Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh, 1991). In this experiment,
humans were offered a choice among the different algorithms of the SRT task. The SELECT
menu appeared with two of three symbols signifying the three algorithms— the alchemical
symbol for sulfur for random sequences, the alchemical symbol for mercury for fixed sequences,
and the astrological symbol for Jupiter for overalternating sequences (see Figure 1) - in
counterbalanced locations. Choice of one of three symbols resulted in presentation of SRT
targets, presented visually as the same symbol that was chosen on the SELECT screen. After the
completion of this preferred 21 item sequence, the menu reappeared with another selection of
symbols. To distinguish the choice of the SELECT menu from the iterative responding required
of the SRT task, presentation of the menu was accompanied by a change in background color of
the task (see Figure 2). To ensure that even less-preferred algorithms were experienced, the
SELECT screen also offered a forced choice of only one of the algorithms on 20% of trials.
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Stimulus

Description
Alchemical symbol for sulfur;
Used in selections and presentations of random sequences.
Alchemical symbol for Mercury;
Used in selections and presentations of fixed sequences.

Astrological symbol for Jupiter;
Used in selections and presentations of overalternating sequences.
Figure 1. Task Stimuli

Figure 2. Task appearance. The top image is an example of a SELECT screen with options to
choose either the fixed (left) or overalternating (right) sequence. The bottom set of images
illustrates the way the first five stimuli of a fixed sequence would appear onscreen
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2.2

Results
In this SRT design, experience may be defined as the number of successful deflections a

participant had prior to the current exposure or as the total exposures to stimuli a participant's
program provided. The difference between the two measures is in whether the participant's
behavior is observed or assumed. A successful deflection constitutes a record that the participant
observed the stimulus, whereas the count of stimulus transitions also credits the participant with
gaining information from stimuli to which they did not deflect. The former definition is more
conservative, and is used for all analyses.
Increased exposures to the different sequence types did not change participant reaction
times in meaningfully different ways (see Figure 3). The characteristic shape of the RT curve is
visible for all three sequence types in the upper plot of Figure 3, with RTs that are relatively high
in earliest trials yet rapidly asymptote at a lower mean RT. The grand means of participants’
mean RTs for the different sequence types were nearly identical overall (fixed = 381 ms,
overalternating = 383 ms, random = 386 ms). When comparing RTs to stimuli appearing before
and after the participant's 175th exposure to a sequence type (an approximation of the midpoint of
the session), participant mean RTs decreased on average by 10 ms for fixed stimuli (SD = 55),
decreased by 3 ms for overalternating stimuli (SD = 43), and increased by 2 ms for random
stimuli (SD = 55). These differences represent a negligible change in RT with experience in the
task.
Choice behaviors in the SELECT task also did not change in the predicted directions.
Visualizations of the change in proportion of sequence types chosen at different blocks of 42
relevant stimulus exposures is presented in Figure 4. In this figure, exposures to both sequences
presented on a given SELECT screen (for example, both experience with both fixed and random
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Figure 3. Mean RTs aggregated across participants. The lower plot aggregates sequence exposures into blocks of 42 and includes
Standard Error bars. Note that due to participant control over how many sequence exposures they received, not all participants are
included in each aggregation.
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 4. Aggregated participant choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of
relevant experience with the task. Blocks are the size of two completed trials (42 stimulus
exposures). Note that due to participant control over how many sequence exposures they received,
not all participants are included in each aggregation.
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sequences) are blocked. Predominance of the fixed sequence (dark blue bar) over alternatives, an
assertion of Hypothesis 2 and important bellwether for viability of interpretations of Hypothesis
3, was not observed. To clarify the effect that experience with the different sequence types had
on choice behaviors and reaction times, mixed-effects models were used.
2.2.1

SRT modeled

SRT data were analyzed by fitting a linear mixed-effects model to predict natural logtransformed reaction times (hereafter, log(RT/ms)) for a trial from the trial's sequence type and
how much experience a participant previously had with that sequence type. Arbitrary names that
identified participants were included as random effects in the model to control for predictable
individual differences of each participant. Mixed-effects modeling techniques are relatively
tolerant of discrepancies of numbers of observations, and thus were used to account for the
disparate numbers of trials for each sequence type that participants completed (given that
participants had agency over the number and types of trials they experienced). Models were fit
using the Statsmodels (Seabold & Perktold, 2010) and Pandas (McKinney, 2010) packages for
Python 2.7 (Python Software Foundation, n. d.).
The results of the linear mixed-effects model (AIC = 9644.96, df = 16) fit for SRT are
presented in Table 2. The fixed effects of the fixed sequence type (β = -.006, SE = .007, p =
.402), the overalternating sequence type (β = .004, SE = .007, p = .609), and the interaction term
representing the effect of increasing experience with the fixed sequence (β = -.00004, SE =
.00003, p =.140) were not significant. The effect of greater experience with sequences (β = .0002, SE = .00008, p = .008), and the interaction representing the effect of increasing experience
with the overalternating sequence type (β = -.00006, SE = .00003, p = .020) were significant.
The coefficient of the significant interaction term of experience in the overalternating
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Table 2. Linear Mixed-Effects Model Fit
Parameter
Β

SE

p

Intercept

5.914

.024

<.001

Experience

-.0002

.00008

.008*

Fixed

-.006

.007

.402

Overalternating

.004

.007

.609

Fixed x Experience

-.00004

-.00004

.140

Overalternating x Experience

-.00006

-.00006

.020*

Notes.*p < .05. The intercept is the grand mean for log(RT/ms) across sequence types. The p
values are computed from Wald z-tests testing whether the model coeffeicient is significantly
different from zero.
sequence (bottom plot of Figure 5) can be interpreted to mean that 100 trials of experience with
the overalternating sequence constitutes a .6% decrease in log(RT/ms). For reference, a .6%
decrease in the grand mean log(RT/ms) in these data, 5.914 (an RT of approximately 370 ms),
would constitute a 23 ms decrease in RT. The effect of the nonsignificant interaction term of
experience in fixed sequences (top plot of Figure 5) would constitute a .4% decrease in
log(RT/ms) for 100 trials of experience in the fixed sequence, a difference from the grand mean
of approximately 9 ms. The interaction term of experience in random sequences (middle plot of
Figure 5) would constitute 1% increase in log(RT/ms) for 100 trials of experience in the random
sequence, a difference from the grand mean of approximately 22 ms. Figure 6 illustrates the
overall fit of the estimations of model to the data. The relatively normal distribution of the
deviations of predicted values from observed around zero indicates a relatively clean fit of model
to data. The discrepancy between model and data at higher numbers of sequence exposures (see
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Figure 5. Averaged observed log(RT/ms) for humans across increasing blocks of experience with
the fixed sequence (top), random sequence (middle), and overalternating sequence (bottom). Each
block was equal to two full sequences, 42 stimulus exposures.
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Figure 6 Visualization of model fit: histograms of frequency of deviations of predicted log(RT/ms)
from observed at different levels of sequence experience in the the fixed sequence (top), random
sequence (middle), and overalternating sequence (bottom). Positive values indicate that predicted
values were higher than observed values.
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the right side of plots of Figure 5) are likely the result of only a subset of participants
experiencing these trials, and of the modeling procedure assigning greater weight to earlier trials
with higher participant numbers. Visualizations of aggregations of the estimated random effects
parameters are presented in Figure 7. These histograms illustrate the degree to which
individualized parameter estimates for each participant improved model fit. The seemingly
bimodal distribution around zero for the estimated random effect of experience (second plot from
top) illustrates that one subset of participants’ RTs increased with experience, while another
subset of participants’ RTs decreased with experience. This parameter estimate might capture a
conflict between learning of sequence properties and boredom due to extensive time working on
the task, an idea that will be considered further in the General Discussion.
2.2.2

SELECT modeled

SELECT data were analyzed by fitting a generalized linear mixed-effects model to
predict binomial participant choices of the more structured option from the options available on
the menu and the amount of experience the participant had with the options available on that
SELECT menu. For example, a participant choosing the structured option (say, the fixed
sequence) was modeled by what the less structured alternative was (say, the random sequence),
and the total number of successful deflections the participant had with fixed and random
sequences. As with the SRT data, arbitrary participant identifiers were included as random
effects in the model to control for any individual differences across participants. The coefficients
of greatest interest, the interactions effect of greater experience that is relevant to a SELECT
menu on choices in that menu, were not significant (fixed v random menu x experience: β =
.0004, SE = .0004, p = .335; fixed v overalternating menu x experience: β = .0002, SE = .0004, p
= .626). No variable significantly predicted the log odds of choosing the structured or
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Figure 7. Histograms of individual participants’ parameter estimations for the grand mean
log(RT/ms) (top), the effect of increasing experience with the different conditions (second from top),
the effect of the sequence being fixed (second from bottom), and the effect of the sequence
overalternating (bottom).
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unstructured option on the SELECT menu.
2.3

Discussion
Participants did not show any evidence of change in sequence choice behaviors across

experience in the task, even as reaction times subtly decreased with greater experience in the
overalternating sequence and increased with greater experience in the random sequence. This
result may suggest an indifference on the part of the participants to the differences in relative
information content, statistical regularities, and potential completion speed across the different
sequence types.
Some considerations burden this interpretation. A statistically observable decrease in
reaction time to stimuli from the fixed sequence, a sequence that is identical every time, was an
assumption of task design that was not evidenced in these data. The statistically significant effect
that was observed, of decrease in time to complete the overalternating sequence, was slight.
3

EXPERIMENT 2

In an effort to make the features of the fixed sequence more explicit, a new sample of
human participants were recruited for a second experiment. In this experiment, the sequences
were shortened from 21 to 9 (with the trial duration shortened from 42 sec to 18 sec,
accordingly). Shortening the sequences yielded several advantages. The working memory load to
encode the sequence properties was much less substantial, with greater proportions of the
sequences able to be tracked at once and more frequent breaks (through more frequent intertrial
intervals (ITIs) and SELECT menu presentations). Participants could make far more choices on
the SELECT menus, a relevant dimension if choice preferences are the result of mapping choices
to sequence outcomes rather than associative experience to stimuli. More SELECT menu choices
also yielded more data, and more opportunities for changes in choice behavior to emerge and be
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observed. Finally, 9 item sequences were a more appropriate sequence length for completion by
the rhesus monkeys.
3.1

Methods
3.1.1

Participants

Twenty-nine Georgia State University undergraduate psychology students participated in
the study for course credit. Ethical considerations and apparatus were identical to those of
Experiment 1.
In addition, five rhesus macaques were tested in their home enclosures at the Language
Research Center of Georgia State University. The monkeys used a version of the Language
Research Center – Computerized Testing Apparatus to make responses (Richardson, Washburn,
Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). Stimuli were presented on a computer
monitor in front of the animals’ home enclosures and responses were made using joysticks
mounted to the front of the animals’ home enclosures. Food rewards of 45 mg banana-flavored
fruit pellets were dispensed by a pellet dispenser. This population of animals had extensive
experience with use of this apparatus to complete a variety of different computer tasks including
serialized economic games (e.g., Parrish, Brosnan, Wilson, & Beran, 2014), a computerized
Monty Hall problem (Klein, Evans, Schultz, & Beran, 2012), numerical judgments (e.g., Harris,
Gulledge, Beran, & Washburn, 2010), and, of particular note, a Serial Reaction Time task
(Heimbauer et al., 2012a and Heimbauer et al., 2012b). In the work by Heimbauer and
colleagues, a subset of this population of animals demonstrated the ability to complete familiar
sequences up to 8 items long more quickly than random sequences, and to complete grammatical
4, 6, and 8 item sequences more quickly than control sequences.
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3.1.2

Training

Because the monkeys were less accustomed to tasks in which many responses are
required before reinforcement, only some animals had previously experienced an SRT task, and
those animals that had previous experience with an SRT task had not seen the task in several
years, all monkeys were first presented with a training version of the task. In this version of the
task, the random algorithm was used to generate one item sequences. If seven out of an animal’s
previous ten trials were successfully completed, the sequence length increased to three. Each
subsequent time that this criterion was met, the sequence length increased by three, up to a
maximum of 21. Once an animal successfully completed 15 trials of this length in total, it was
transitioned to the full version of the task. If seven out of an animal's previous ten trials were not
successfully completed, the sequence length decreased by three. After 15 repetitions of the
sequence length incrementing to a number, then decrementing from it, the animal was considered
to be at asymptote and was transitioned to the full version of the task at the highest number of
deflections to reward at which it established proficiency. This criterion was established in order
to limit any exposure to the task above and beyond what was necessary for training, and prevent
overtraining with an exclusively random version of the task.
Completion of a sequence through consecutive, timely deflections rewarded monkeys
with a number of 45 mg pellet rewards commensurate with the length of the sequence completed
(sequence lengths of 1 and 3 yield 1 pellet; lengths of 6 and 9 yield 2 pellets; lengths of 12 and
15 yield 3 pellets; lengths 18 and 21 yield 4 pellets), and an ITI equal to the difference between
the maximum sequence length-times-two and the time it took to finish the sequence. For
example, completing a 21-item sequence in 35 seconds would yield 4 pellets and an ITI of 7
seconds.
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3.1.3

Training results

This criterion for establishing asymptotic performance for the monkeys was excessively
strict. No monkey was able to pass criteria above a sequence length of one before being judged
as asymptotic. For this reason, the cap for asymptote was quadrupled, to 60 repetitions of the the
animal incrementing to a new sequence length, then decrementing from it. To continue to limit
excessive experience with the training version of the task, monkeys were automatically moved to
the full version of the task once proficiency was established with sequences of length six. Three
pellets were awarded for completing six item sequences, two pellets for three item sequences,
and one pellet for one item sequences. Some descriptive information on each monkey's training
history is presented in Table 3 and in Appendix B. All monkeys passed these new training
criteria, and completed tens of thousands of joystick deflections in the task.
3.2

Results
Human RTs decreased in a similar way as in Experiment 1, with high RTs on initial trials

sharply decreasing to asymptote (see the upper plot of Figure 8). Grand means of individual
participants’ mean RTs for fixed, overalternating, and random sequences were nearly identical
(413 ms, 409 ms, and 416 ms, respectively). The change in mean RTs to fixed stimuli from first
half of sequence exposures (100 sequence exposures was the approximate midpoint in this
dataset) to the second half doubled from Experiment 1, to a 20 ms decrease (SD = 49). Changes
in mean RTs across the two halve s of the experiment for overalternating stimuli (mean increase
of 1 ms, SD = 51) and random stimuli (mean increase of 7 ms, SD = 35 ms) were similar to
those of Experiment 1.
Unlike the RTs of human participants in Experiments 1 and 2, monkey RTs were volatile,
even when aggregated across 1000 or more stimulus exposures. Figure 9 shows the five
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Table 3. Training Summary
Monkey
Training
Sessions

Experimental Stimulus Exposures
Fixed

Overalternating

Random

Total

Hank

25

18708

13888

29089

61685

Murph

8

31856

28204

16640

76700

Lou

6

22300

22886

24462

69648

Chewie

9

31573

34342

33903

99818

Obi

7

24106

20439

20088

64633
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Figure 8. Mean RTs aggregated across human participants. The lower plot aggregates sequence exposures into blocks of 27 and includes
Standard Error bars. Note that due to participant agency over how many sequence exposures they received, not all participants are
included in each aggregation.
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Figure 9. Mean RTs to stimuli from fixed (top), random (middle), and overalternating (bottom)
sequence types for each monkey. The lower plot aggregates sequence exposures into blocks of 1000
stimulus exposures.
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monkeys’ mean RTs aggregated across 1000-trial exposures to stimuli from the fixed sequence
(top plot), random sequence (middle plot), and overalternating sequence (bottom plot). From one
block of 1000 stimulus exposures to another, monkeys’ mean RTs were observed to change by as
much as 100 ms. Surprisingly, monkeys’ RTs were also much slower than those of human
participants. With the exception of the monkey Chewie, the monkeys’ RTs to the stimuli were
nearly 200 ms slower than those of human participants, on average. Like those of human
participants, the monkeys’ RTs were relatively unaffected by the embedded structures of the
fixed and overalternating sequences (Figure 10). Instead, RTs for the stimuli of the different
sequences can largely be understood as deviations around the mean RT of an individual animal
(for example, the relatively stable RT of approximately 450 ms of Chewie in the uppermost
plot).
Figures 11 through 16 capture the choice behaviors of the human participants and
individual monkeys in the SELECT task of Experiment 2. As in Experiment 1, stable sequence
preferences were not observed in aggregated human data. Three out of five monkeys also did not
exhibit stable changes in choice behavior. Monkey Hank (Figure 12) reliably chose the random
sequence. Monkey Murph (Figure 13) chose the fixed sequence over the random sequence, the
fixed sequence over the overalternating sequence, and the overalternating sequence over the
random sequence.
3.2.1

SRT modeled.

The overall analysis plan remained the same as in Experiment 1. Two additional potential
predictors were included in the linear mixed-effects model for SRT data. One was species,
included as a fixed effect in the model. The other was a measure of overall experience with the
task, as the monkeys' high trial numbers made such a predictor more informative. The results
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Figure 10. The mean RT plots from Figure 9, rearranged to capture effect of sequence type on RT
for each monkey. From top: Hank, Murph, Lou, Chewie, Obi
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 11. Aggregated human participant choices in different SELECT menus across different
levels of relevant experience with the task. Blocks are of 27 stimulus exposures.

39

Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 12. Aggregated choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of relevant
experience with the task for monkey Hank. Blocks are of 1000 stimulus exposures.
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 13. Aggregated choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of relevant
experience with the task for monkey Murph. Blocks are of 1000 stimulus exposures.
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 14. Aggregated choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of relevant
experience with the task for monkey Lou. Blocks are of 1000 stimulus exposures.
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 15. Aggregated choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of relevant
experience with the task for monkey Chewie. Blocks are of 1000 stimulus exposures.
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Fixed

Random

Overalternating

Figure 16. Aggregated choices in different SELECT menus across different levels of relevant
experience with the task for monkey Obi. Blocks are of 1000 stimulus exposures.
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of the linear mixed-effects model (AIC = 81790.641, df = 29) fit for the SRT data are presented
in Table 4. The fixed effect of species was significant (β = -.18, SE = .030, p < .001), such that
humans' log(RT/ms) were approximately 18% faster than monkeys (a difference of
approximately 102 ms). The three-way interaction between species, the fixed trial type, and
experience with the fixed trial type was significant (β = -.00009, SE = .00002, p = .005) such that
human reaction times decreased in the fixed sequence with experience in the task whereas
monkeys’ did not (see Figures 17 and 18). In general, the model underestimated human RTs and
overestimated monkey RTs. This is likely due to both the large imbalance in the number of trials
monkeys completed relative to human participants and the difference in mean RTs for humans
and monkeys. To better capture the joint effects of species and individual differences,
aggregations of the estimated random effects parameters are presented in Figures 19 and 20.
Certain parameters had a disproportionate effect on the RT of certain individuals (for example,
the RTs of monkey Lou on the bottom plot of Figure 20 were best predicted by lower estimates
for the coefficient of the effect of experience in the task). But in both species, individual
parameter estimates were distributed around zero such that the coefficient of a predictor, for
example, experience in the task, might be positive for one participant and negative for another.
As in Experiment 1, genuine experimental effects may be obscured by conflict between learning
and deleterious experience effects.
3.2.2

SELECT modeled.

The human and monkey data were modeled separately due to constraints associated with
the great difference in experience with the menus for the monkeys and humans. Human choice
behavior did not significantly change in any menu in interaction with increased experience
relevant to that menu (fixed v random menu x experience: B = .0007, SE = .0005, p =.176; fixed
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Table 4. Linear Mixed-Effects Model Fit
Parameter
β

SE

p

Intercept

6.138

.041

>.001*

Sequence Experience

-.001

.027

.970

Overall Experience

-.0002

.025

.992

Fixed

.013

.032

.693

Overalternating

-.001

.033

.965

Human

-.180

.041

<.001*

Fixed x Sequence Experience

-.0001

.00003

<.001*

Overalternating x Sequence
Experience

-.00003

.00003

.210

Human x Sequence Experience

-.001

.027

.970

Fixed x Sequence Experience
for Humans

-.0001

.00003

<.001*

Overalternating x Sequence
Experience for Humans

-.00003

.00003

.213

Notes.*p < .05. The intercept is the grand mean for log(RT/ms) across sequence types. The p
values are computed from Wald z-tests testing whether the model coefficient is significantly
different from zero.
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Figure 17. Averaged observed log(RT/ms) for humans across increasing blocks of experience with
the fixed sequence (top), random sequence (middle), and overalternating sequence (bottom). Each
block was equal to two full sequences, 18 stimulus exposures.

47

Figure 18. Averaged observed log(RT/ms) for monkeys across increasing blocks of experience with
the fixed sequence (top), random sequence (middle), and overalternating sequence (bottom). Each
block was equal to 50 full sequences, 300 stimulus exposures.

48

Figure 19. Histograms of frequency of deviations of individual human participants’ parameter
estimations from overall fixed effect parameter estimation for the grand mean log(RT/ms) (topleft), the effect of increasing experience with the different conditions (top-right), the effect of the
sequence being fixed (middle-left), the effect of the sequence overalternating (middle-right), and the
effect of increasing experience in the task across conditions (bottom).
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Figure 20. Individual monkeys’ parameter estimations for the grand mean log(RT/ms) (top-left), the effect of increasing experience with
the different conditions (top-right), the effect of the sequence being fixed (middle-left), the effect of the sequence overalternating (middleright), and the effect of increasing experience in the task across conditions (bottom).
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v overalternating menu x experience: B = -.0008, SE = .0005, p = .092). Monkey choice
behavior significantly changed in the fixed v random menu (B = -.00004, SE = .000008, p <
.001) but not in the fixed v overalternating menu (B = -.000003, SE = .000008, p = .668).
3.3

Discussion
As in Experiment 1, the data revealed few meaningful effects of learning in the SRT task

or choice behavior in the SELECT task with increasing task experience. The monkeys, with
hundreds of times the task experience of the human participants, failed to demonstrate either a
meaningful shift in choice behaviors or mastery of the structured sequences of the SRT task. The
methodological changes from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2 were effective in concentrating
human participant’s learning of the fixed sequence. Human participants RTs to fixed stimuli
decreased across exposures to these stimuli. Yet choice behaviors were not observed to change in
concert with decreasing RTs, and Experiment 2 failed to replicate the decrease in RTs for
overalternating stimuli that was observed in Experiment 1.
4

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across two experiments and two species, the changes in RTs to structured stimuli that
were predicted in Hypothesis 1 were observed only inconsistently. Experiment 1 demonstrated a
change in RT to overalternating stimuli only, whereas Experiment 2 demonstrated a change in
RT to fixed stimuli only, and only in humans. This null result for Hypothesis 1 thwarts
interpretations of the choice behaviors of the humans and monkeys that are relevant to
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.
The inconsistency of significant change in RT to fixed or overalternating stimuli can be
understood as a consequence of aspects of the experimental design. In order to maximize ability
to interpret a change in choice behavior as a specific response to sequence properties, trial
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durations were constant within sessions. This means that for human participants, task
performance, whether in terms of time to complete a trial or in trial success or failure, was not
incentivized. The fairly monotonous rhythm of the SRT task perhaps compounded motivational
issues by making participants more keenly aware of the lack of incentives for participating
actively. In order to preserve comparisons with a literature on randomness perception that has
long focused on binary outcomes, a binary version of SRT task was used. But this use of only
two responses might have made learning fixed and overalternating sequences more difficult for
humans by burdening short-term and working memory systems with many associations linked to
only two response items (i.e., a network of associative interference from the constant acquisition
of more transitions associated with, say, the left response).
Observable effects of these variations to task parameters and incentive structure are
perhaps evidenced in comparisons between the different experiments and species of this
manuscript, and in comparisons with previous research. In Experiment 1, participants completed
21 item sequences approximately 62% of the time. In Experiment 2, participants completed 9
item sequences approximately 72% of the time. Non-completion of sequences should not have
made a meaningful difference to data analyses, but may have contributed to participant’s lack of
learning of the transitional probabilities embedded in the sequences. For example, a participant
who saw an average of three items in each sequence responded to a very different corpus of
stimulus regularities than did a participant who responded to the full breadth of each sequence.
Moreover, a lack of motivation to complete the task as designed may have incentivized exploring
the task parameters in unknown ways. One observed example of this might be the unusual
propensity of participants to “select” the blank space of the SELECT screen on forced trials.
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Monkeys, however, received pellet rewards for successful task completion and were thus
suitably incentivized on at least this dimension of task performance. With this incentive in place,
the animals completed 88% of their 6-item sequences overall. However, the monkeys’ mean RT
of 572 ms was substantially slower than that of humans in both Experiment 1 (mean RT: 387 ms)
and Experiment 2 (mean RT: 404 ms). Were the trial durations to be unlocked so that faster
sequence completions increased the overall rate of reward, the animals might be suitably
incentivized to demonstrate the effect of learning that is typically observed in SRT and statistical
learning designs (e.g., Heimbauer et al., 2012a). Unlocking trial durations would at least allow
for interpretation of Hypothesis 1, even if trends in the SELECT data would be much less
valuable because they may be the result of task parameters other than the properties of the
sequence (overall reward rate, latency between choice behavior and reward, etc.).
In the previous work of Heimbauer and colleagues (2012a), two of the monkeys from
Experiment 2 (Obi and Lou) and one additional animal (Luke) demonstrated faster responding
for sequences that were the same each time (as in the fixed sequences of this experiment) than
for random sequences. The difference in results of those experiments and Experiment 2 of this
manuscript is notable for a few reasons (see Figures 16, 17, and 18). In the Heimbauer et al.
(2012a) experiments, ITIs were constant and did not titrate up and down in order to keep trial
duration constant. This methodological difference, embedded in a largely equivalent SRT
procedure with the same population of monkeys, acts as experimental evidence that the locked
trial duration of the experiments presented here negated some part of the predicted effect of
sequence learning. The mean RTs of the individual animals are also noteworthy. Despite these
animals receiving fewer pellets for sequence completion and responding to stimuli in four
directions (up, down, left, right) rather than the two directions (left, right) of this manuscript,
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Figure 21. Mean RTs for two monkeys from this manuscript in a previous SRT task by Heimbauer et al. (2012a). Animals completed 8
item sequences of fixed (repeating) significantly more quickly than random (randomized) stimuli at each of the 8 stimulus positions. This
effect was present in both the animals' final 10 sessions and in the experiment overall
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: Fixed Sequence
: Random Sequence

Figure 22. Mean RTs to different sequence positions for the monkeys from Experiment 2 in their final 5 sessions. Clockwise from top-left:
Obi, Lou, Chewie, Hank, Murph
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: Fixed Sequence
: Random Sequence

Figure 23. Mean RTs to different sequence positions for the monkeys from Experiment 2 across all sessions. Clockwise from top-left: Obi,
Lou, Chewie, Hank, Murph
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their mean RTs within each session were, without exception, below the mean RT for monkeys in
Experiment 2.
In the works of Wilke and colleagues (2014) reviewed previously, human participants’
and rhesus macaques’ choice behaviors changed in response to experience with sequences.
Specifically, participants preferentially chose sequences that alternated least and streaked most.
The absence of this effect in both Experiments 1 and 2 is unexpected, and perhaps another
byproduct from these experiments' constant trial durations. Without set trial durations
participants could seek to maximize rewards through strategic decision-making on the SELECT
task, and the choice behaviors observed by Wilke and colleagues would likely re-emerge.
Nevertheless, a unique contribution of Experiments 1 and 2 is to nuance one potential conclusion
of the work of Wilke and colleagues. One way of understanding the findings of those researchers
is to conclude that specific sequence properties elicit specific decision behaviors. For example,
mere observation of overalternating (clumpy) probabilistic environments elicit behaviors that
seek more of such environments. But observation alone, without differential feedback or reward
structures, was not sufficient to change choice behaviors of the participants of Experiments 1 and
2. Other associative cues and other learning is probably required for the previously reported
shifts in choice behaviors.
Previous research has done much to explore the ways in which humans and animals
interact with probabilistic information, make choices in probabilistic environments, and make
explicit and implicit judgments about the probabilistic structures with which their environments
are laden. The present pair of experiments was designed to try to unify two separate bodies of
this research: that of how humans come to make judgments about the relative randomness and
nonrandomness of sequences and that of the powerful statistical learning mechanism through
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which sequence properties are implicitly learned. To make that unification, however, design
elements were required that cannibalized the well-established effects that were to be paired. Most
notably, the decision to make trial duration constant probably did much to limit any
demonstration of learning or development of change in choice behaviors. Without constant trial
durations, the stated interpretations of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 become fraught with alternative
explanations. However, with constant trial durations, Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are evidently
uninterpretable from the outset.
A parallel design could unlock trial durations, and reward humans for sequence
completions with small monetary compensation. This could provide evidence for sequence
learning in sequences of binary stimuli, a goal of Hypothesis 1. This design would also be akin to
a replication and extension of the work of Wilke and colleagues, in that a correlation between
sequence properties and choice behavior could be established (with the added component of
having a measure of learning of sequence properties to accompany the correlation) (Blanchard,
Wilke, & Hayden, 2014; Scheibehenne et al., 2011; Wilke et al., 2014). This design, perhaps
with a sequence entropy measure to synthesize the information content a participant received
more minutely, might offer a way forward for answering this theoretically interesting question of
human and animal cognition.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Sequence generation procedure for overalternating sequences
The overalternating sequences were designed to have a specified set of properties that
serve both to fulfill previously-documented expectations that humans have of random sequences
and to have a consistent internal structure:

1. The first item in any sequence is [pseudo]randomly generated.
2. All four-item tuples are tested for three kinds of apparent serial dependencies:
a. All four items are identical. In this case, the next item generated will always be
different from the previous four.
b. Each item of the four is different from both the one preceding and succeeding it.
In this case, this apparent symmetry will be corrected by appending a fifth item that is
identical to the fourth.
c. The four items are the concatenation of two runs of the same item twice. In this
case, the next item appended to the sequence will be the same as the fourth item of
the tuple.
3. Any item that is not the first, and not following one of the corrected serial dependencies,
alternates from the identity of the previous item 83% of the time. This number is used to
preserve the global 65% alternation rate of the algorithm.
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Appendix B: Training progress for each Rhesus macaque
Plots are for Hank, Murph, Lou, Chewie, and Obi, respectively. Completion rates are the
rates at which monkeys completed sequences that were 1 item long (blue bar), 3 items long
(orange bar), 6 items long (green bar), or 9 items long (red bar).
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